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PLEDGING A NEW ALLEGIANCE:
AN ESSAY ON SOVEREIGNTY
AND THE NEW FEDERALISM

Daniel A. Farber*

This Essay explores an emerging vision of federalism and its implementation in recent state immunity cases.' Those recent cases reflect, I believe, not just a legal interpretation of the Tenth and
Eleventh Amendments, but a coherent understanding of our governmental system and its relationship with citizens. Beyond that, I believe, these decisions also reflect a sense of personal allegiance to
certain aspects of that system. Attacks on the historical, textual, or
precedential basis for the majority's rulings fall on deaf ears, because
the attacks cannot shake the Justices' loyalty to what they conceive to
be the American system of government.
Indeed, at the possible risk of seeming to over-dramatize its novelty, we might even imagine a new Pledge of Allegiance that would
better reflect current constitutional doctrine. The New Federalist
pledge might read something like this: "I pledge allegiance to the flag
of the United States of America, and to the republics for which it
stands, one Federal System under God, indivisible, with liberty and
justice for all." Obviously, this is not quite the version of the pledge

* Henry J. Fletcher Professor and Associate Dean for Faculty, University of
Minnesota Law School. I would like to thankJim Chen, Dan Meltzer, Suzanna Sherry,
and Gil Grantmore for their helpful comments.
1 My focus will be on cases involving sovereign immunity from suit, but I will also
discuss sovereign immunity from "commandeering." For background on both issues,
see LAuRFNcE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 519-66, 879-94 (3d ed.
1999). A particularly good introduction to the 11th Amendment and its tangledjurisprudence can be found in Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign
Immunity, 1996 St. CT. REv. 1. For historical background on the concept of sovereignty in American constitutionalism, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425 (1987), and H. Jefferson Powell, The Political Grammar of Early
ConstitutionalLaw, 71 N.C. L. REv. 848 (1993).
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that most of us learned as school children, 2 but it brings home the
essentials of the New Federalism now embraced by a majority of the
Justices.
The revamped pledge highlights several ways in which the majority's vision of America differs from the familiar. Allegiance belongs,
not to "the Republic," but to the country's fifty-one republics, state
and federal-not to the Nation alone, but to the system of federal and
state power. Still, there are similarities-the flag continues to represent an indivisible union of states, not the several states as a mere federation; the federal system encompasses not only a role for the states
but also a very powerful one for the federal government; and perhaps
most importantly, the system remains committed to "liberty and justice for all." Thus, the Court is focused on three goals: upholding the
states as republics worthy of allegiance, maintaining the established
balance of federal and state power, and defending constitutional
rights-"liberty and justice for all," as defined by the Court itselfagainst threats from either level of government. 3
This Essay explores how the Court has struggled with the tensions
inherent in this vision: the need to uphold the dignity of the states
without undermining national unity, the difficulty of confining both
state and federal governments to their existing spheres of authority
without undercutting either one, and the need to prevent immunity
claims from fatally compromising individual rights. In particular, recent sovereign immunity decisions fall neatly into place within this
framework. An unsympathetic oberver might consider these tensions
to be largely of the majority's own making, but if we take these tensions as given, the Court's efforts to manage them are worthy of respect. Parts I-III of this Essay discuss the three main tenets of the New
Federalism creed and show how they are faithfully mirrored in current Eleventh Amendment doctrine. The Essay closes by considering
the future of the New Federalism, or more bluntly, whether these new,
more dispersed loyalties will overcome the old pledge of allegiance to
the United States as "One Nation" rather than "One Federal System."

2 See 36 U.S.C. § 172 (1994). The phrase "under God" is a Cold War era addition. See Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Ceremonial Deism, 96

COLUM. L. REV. 2083, 2118-22 (1996).
3 For purposes of this Essay, I am putting to the side the question of whether the
Court will successfully be able to apply the New Federalism as a principled limit on
national power. See Frank B. Cross, Realism About Federalism, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1304

(1999).
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IEPuBL c FOR WHIC ITr SAvDs":

STATES AND REPUBLICAN

S= -GovERNMENT

For the student of constitutional history, much of the rhetoric in
recent Supreme Court opinions is startling. Rather than echoing Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, the Court's
language often seems more reminiscent of the views of their opponents. 4 But it would be a mistake to view the current Court simply as
an apostle of "states' rights." Rather, concern about states' rights is
part of a more complex worldview. That worldview also attaches importance to maintaining the current balance of power between state
and federal government, as well as to protecting individual constitutional rights.
Perhaps the most striking aspect of the Court's recent federalism
opinions is the majority's reverential language toward the states. In
his opinion in Alden v. Maine,5 Justice Kennedy says that the Constitution reserves to the states "a substantial portion of the Nation's primary sovereignty, together with the dignity and essential attributes
inhering in that status." 6 A few paragraphs later he quotes the Feder7
alist Papers on the "residual and inviolable sovereignty" of the states,
adding that they "are not relegated to the rule of mere provinces or
political corporations, but retain the dignity, though not the full authority, of sovereignty."8 He also characterizes as "startling even today" a statement by one of the Framers that the state governments
should be subordinate to the federal government. 9
Speaking for four of the five members of the Alden majority in an
earlier case, Justice Thomas used even more sweeping language about
the states. In his Term Limits dissent, he said that the "ultimate source
4 See Vicki C. Jackson, Coeur D'Alene, FederalCourts and the Supremacy of Federal
Law: The Competing Paradigmsof ChiefJusticesMarshall and Rehnquist, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 301 (1998) [hereinafter Jackson, Federal Courts]; Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism
and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and Principle, 111 HARv. L. REV. 2180, 2195
(1998) ("[Justice Scalia's] theory of dual sovereignty... is fundamentally at variance
with principles of constitutionalism that date at least to McCulloch v. Maryland...
[hereinafter Jackson, Federalism];H. Jefferson Powell, The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 79 VA. L. Ruv. 634, 678-79 (1993) (contrasting Justice O'Connor's views
with those of the Marshall Court); see also Daniel A. Farber, The Constitution'sForgotten
Cover Letter:.An Essay on the New Federalism and the Original Understanding,94 MICH.L.
Rrv. 615, 636-37 (1995) (discussing Justice Thomas's theory of state sovereignty).
5 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
6 Id. at 2247.
7 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALiSr No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961)).

8

Id.

9

Id. at 2252.
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of the Constitution's authority is the consent of the people of each
individual State, not the consent of the undifferentiated people of the
Nation as a whole"-adding that "the people of the several States are
the only true source of power."' 0 Even today, he seemed to indicate,
state sovereignty is primary: "the people of each State retained their
separate political identities,"" and the "very name 'congress' suggests
12
a coming together of representatives from distinct entities."'
Taken at full value, this language would suggest very little difference between the Constitution and the Articles of Confederation that
preceded it. Although, as we will see, this language is subject to several limiting principles, it also vividly expresses the Court's allegiance
to the states as co-sovereigns. Nor is this new-found respect for the
states merely window-dressing. For instance, the Court's faith in the
states as primary centers for republican self-government 3 is reflected
in its flat ban on "federal commandeering" of state legislators and
administrators.'

4

Recent Eleventh Amendment decisions also bear the imprint of
this tenet of the New Federalism. The decisions are replete with references to the dignity of the states, a dignity that would be offended if
they were freely subject to suit by mere individuals. 15 Justice Kennedy's effort to justify sovereign immunity explicitly invokes norms of
republican self-government: "If the principle of representative government is to be preserved to the States, the balance between competing
interests must be reached after deliberation by the political process
established by the citizens of the State, not by judicial decree mandated by the Federal Government and invoked by the private citizen.' 6 Thus, the perceived mandate to protect the "dignity" of the
states from being sullied by certain kinds of litigation stems from their
unique role in republican self-govenrment. The state sovereignty
tenet of the New Federalism also helps account for some of the exceptions to sovereign immunity. To some extent, local governments may
10

U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 846-47 (1995) (Thomas, J.,

dissenting).
11 Id. at 849.
12 Id. at 857-58.
13 See Deborah Jones Merritt, Republican Governments andAutonomous States: A New
Role for the GuaranteeClause, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 815 (1994) (explaining the relationship between recent federalism decisions and republicanism).
14 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress cannot
impose even a modest ministerial duty on low-level state officials); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that even a compelling national interest could
not justify commandeering of state legislature).
15 See Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NoTR DAME L. REV. 1121 (2000).
16 Alden v. Maine, 119 S.Ct. 2240, 2265 (1999).
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participate in the project of republican self-government by the people
of each state. 17 But they shine only in a reflected light. In the New
Federalist view, only states as such have genuine constitutional stature.
Recall Justice Thomas's emphasis on the sovereignty collectively reposing in the people of each state. Unlike the thirteen original states,
no city government has ever had a pretense to independent sovereignty.' 8 Moreover, cities are not truly subjects of selfgovernment: all
of their decisions (and even their continued existence as separate
legal entities) are subject to the control of the population of the state
as a whole, acting through the state legislature. Thus, it is understandable that the Court has no quarrel with the traditional rule conferring
immunity on state governments, but not local governments. 19
The Alden Court also accepted the traditional exception for suits
against states by the federal government. This exception, too, fits with
the notion of fifty-one sovereign republics. For as the Court points
out, the federal government is not unique in its authority to sue the
other "sovereigns." The states can also sue each other under the
Supreme Court's originaljurisdiction. Thus, each of the "members of
the federal system"-the federal government and the fifty states-has
the right to bring suit against others "as an alternative to extralegal
measures." 20 Hence, according to the Court, a waiver of sovereign
immunity as against other members of the federal system was implicit
'2 1
in the "plan of the Constitution."
Thus, the concept of state-level sovereignty has real doctrinal consequences rather than being merely a rhetorical flourish. But if it is a
mistake to dismiss the significance of this rhetoric, it is also a mistake
to expect a revolution in American government, for there are two
other tenets that go far to moderate the implications of the New
Federalism.
17 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 933 (suking down federal statute imposing affirmative
duties on local law enforcement officials).
18 Notably, the seminal case establishing the absence of municipal l1th Amendment immunity, Lincoln County v. Luning, 133 U.S. 529, 530 (1890), held that a
county "is a part of the state only in that remote sense in which any city, town, or
other municipal corporation may be said to be a part of the state," citing in support of
this proposition only MetropolitanRailroad Co. v. Districtof Columbia, 132 U.S. 1 (1889).
Once other municipalities were compared with the District of Columbia, the game
was up: the District is more like a colony than a sovereign.
19 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2266. In contrast to the organs of state government
such as state legislators and governors, local officials are unmentioned in the constitutional text.
20 Id. at 2267.
21 Id. at 2269.
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MAINTAINING THE BALANCE OF STATE

AND FEDERAL POWER

In Alden, the Court stressed that federal statutes authorizing suit
against the states were a relatively recent innovation, with little precedent before the "last generation." 2 2 Similarly, the Court characterized
the "commandeering" statutes as unique, unprecedented innovations
with no roots in American history.23 Thus, the Court has positioned
itself as the defender of the "traditional" constitutional structuretraditional as of about 1970 or so-against dangerous efforts to upset
the balance of power between the federal government and the states.
Indeed, this concept of "balance" is central to the recent revival of
24
federalism.
Arguably, the most startling of the recent federalism rulings was
United States v. Lopez, 2 5 the first decision since the New Deal to hold
that Congress had exceeded its regulatory powers under the commerce clause. 26 But even in Lopez, the Court was quite careful to stress
that it saw itself as preserving the existing balance of power rather
than rolling back federal power. Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion separated the post-New Deal caselaw into several categories
and concluded that the statute before the Court did not fall into any
of the existing categories. Thus, he portrayed the ruling as a refusal
to expand federal power beyond already recognized bounds, rather
than as a reduction in federal authority.27 Justice Kennedy's crucial
concurrence, joined by Justice O'Connor, concluded that the statute
"upsets the federal balance" by invading a traditional area of state regulation outside of the commercial arena that is the focal point of modern federal regulation. 28 OnlyJustice Thomas indicated any desire to
call into question the doctrinal basis for the New Deal and subsequent
economic regulations, and he wrote only for himself.29
The unwillingness of the Court to challenge what it views as the
existing order is clearly expressed in Alden. While stressing the need
to respect the states as 'joint participants in a federal system," Justice
Kennedy spoke in the same breadth in Alden of the "ample means"
22 Id. at 2261.
23 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 161-69; Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898, 905-11 (1997).
24 See Lawrence Lessig, TranslatingFederalism: United States v. Lopez, 1995 Sup.
CT. REV. 125, 135-43.

25
26
27
28
29

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
See Lessig, supra note 24, at 128.
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
Id. at 576-80, 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 584-90 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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available to enforce federal law.8 0 "Congress," he said, "has vast power
but not all power."3 ' Nothing in the opinion, or in other recent majority opinions, indicates any disposition toward a serious challenge of
that "vast power." Instead, the New FederalistJustices as a group seem
to conceive of themselves as defending the status quo, preserving only
the limits on that "vast" federal power that have been respected
through most of the post-New Deal era, and protecting those limits
against the recent threat of an omnipotent nationalism. This may be
bad history"-after all, the Court is writing in an era whose recent
political history bears the heavy imprint of a Reagan, not a Roosevelt.
Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt the sincerity of the majority's self-proclaimed effort to maintain the modern balance of power.
Indeed, in at least some areas-such as the dormant Commerce
Clause-the Court has remained quite aggressive in limiting state au32
thority in the name of national interests.
The Court continues to acknowledge the paramount need for adequate enforcement of federal law. In Alden, the Court lists no fewer
than five mechanisms for enforcing federal law against states: grants
of federal funds in return for waivers of immunity, suits by the federal
government itself, individual suits under statutes implementing the
Fourteenth Amendment, suits against state officers for injunctive relief, and individual damage suits against state officers.3 3 Hence, the
Court concluded, "[t] he principle of sovereign immunity as reflected
in our jurisprudence strikes the proper balance between the
supremacy of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the states,"
providing "ample means to correct ongoing violations of law and to
vindicate the interests which animate the Supremacy Clause."34
In sum, the Court views the federal system as one where federal
law is paramount within its sphere, but with implementation mechanisms that are tempered by an appreciation for the state role in the
system. In Alden itself, the Court did not believe that the interest in
enforcing federal law was seriously at stake. After all, Justice Kennedy
said, the United States had not found the federal interest sufficiently
30 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2268.
31 Id.
32 See, e.g., Camps Newfound v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (holding
that charitable exemption statute violated dormant Commerce Clause); C & A Car-

bone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383 (1994) (holding ordinance requiring
solid waste from town to be processed at town's transfer station unconstitutional in
violation of the Commerce Clause).
33 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2267.
34 Id. at 2268.
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important to 'Justify sending even a single attorney to Maine to prose3' 5
cute this litigation.
III.

"VrU LIBER7TY AAD JUSTICE.FORALL ":

PROTECTING

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

If the majority were truly on a crusade to limit federal power and
resurrect the states' rights doctrines of an earlier era, it might take
serious aim at the bevy of post-New Deal decisions that drastically limit
state power. Yet a casual glance at any recent volume of the United
States Reports or at the annual supplement to any constitutional law
casebook reveals the contrary. Although the Rehnquist Court obviously has a more conservative bent than the Warren Court or even the
Burger Court, it remains enthusiastic about limiting state power when
individual rights are at stake. Even a casual newspaper reader knows
that the Court has taken action against the states in fields ranging
from free speech 3 6 to land use regulation 37 to political redistricting3 8
and affirmative action.3 9 The Court's interest in states' rights ends at
the point where its commitment to individual rights begins.
The same is true of the Court's view of congressional power: federalism restrictions on that power end precisely where Congress undertakes to enforce the Court's constitutional rulings. 40 When those
judicially defined individual rights are at stake, federalism goes by the
wayside. Thus, even the anti-commandeering principle may well bow
35

Id. at 2269.

36 See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (holding city hate speech
ordinance violated the First Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989)
(holding state prohibition of flag burning violated the freedom of speech).
37 See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding
that permission to rebuild house could not be conditioned on transfer of easement
absent compensation); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (holding that landowner may recover for taking by land
use regulation).
38 See, e.g., Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995) (holding that state redistricting
plan violated equal protection); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (holding
state reapportionment statute unconstitutional under U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 2).
39 See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989) (holding
that city affirmative action plan violated equal protection); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 476 U.S. 267 (1986) (holding city schoolteacher layoff plan protecting racial
minorities unconstitutional as violation of equal protection).
40 The word "precisely" is important here. As City of Boerne shows, the Court believes that congressional power to protect individual rights means the power to protect those rights as defined by the Court itself, not Congress's conception of "liberty
and justice for all." See City of Bourne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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to Congress's enforcement powers under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth,
41
and Fifteenth Amendments, as does the state's sovereign immunity.
The Court has made particular efforts to reconcile its attachment
to sovereign immunity with protection of individual rights. Three exceptions to sovereign immunity jointly operate to prevent sovereign
immunity from wiping out the individual's constitutional rights. First,
as pointed out earlier, individuals may obtain prospective relief
against states and damages against state officials and local governments for violations of federal law.
Second, due process requires that states provide a damage remedy for certain injuries to individuals. 42 For instance, states may well
have a duty to provide a remedy for deliberate patent nifringements
by state instrumentalities. 43 Sovereign immunity also provides no
shield against state liability for regulations that in effect take private
property without just compensation. 44
Third, when protecting what the Court defines as a constitutional
right, Congress may override state immunity entirely. 45 'When Congress enacts appropriate legislation" to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, "federal interests are paramount, and Congress may assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise unauthorized by the Constitution."46 Admittedly, the Court takes seriously the
limitation of congressional power, in this formulation, to enforcement
of judicially recognized constitutional rights. It also takes seriously its
responsibility to ascertain whether such a dire response as abrogating
state immunity is necessary. 47 (It is apparently for the Court, not for
Congress, to define the meaning of "liberty and justice for all.") But
41 See Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New Etiquette of Federalism:New
York, Printz, and Yeskey, 1998 Sup. CT. REv. 71, 119-33.
42 See Alden v. Maine, 119 S. Ct. 2240, 2259 (1999).
43 See Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 119
S. Ct. 2199, 2208 (1999) ("Only where the State provides no remedy, or only inadequate remedies, to injured patent owners for its infringement of their patent could a
deprivation of property without due process result.") In the case before it, however,
the Court found "scant support for the predicate unconstitutional conduct that Congress intended to remedy." Id. at 2210.
44 See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482
U.S. 304 (1987).
45 Such suits may be heard in state as well as federal court. Cf Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356 (1990) (preventing use by state court of nonconstitutionally based immunity to bar 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) suit brought against school board in state
court).
46 Alden, 119 S.Ct. at 2267.
47 See College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119
S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
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when state sovereignty really does stand as a significant barrier to individual rights, state sovereignty rather than individual rights must give
way. In summary, as much as the New Federalist Justices revere state
sovereignty, they view the states as only part of an overall system of
government that also includes "vast" federal powers and vigilant federal protection of constitutional rights. Their ultimate allegiance is to
the state and federal republics as part of a modem federalist system,
constrained as a whole by individual rights.
Once the conceptual framework of the New Federalism is in
place, the contours of sovereign immunity doctrine become clearly
understandable. In working out the limits of state sovereign immunity, the Court has sought to uphold what it views as the unique constitutional status of the states without unduly sacrificing the supremacy
of federal law or the sanctity of individual constitutional rights.
Rather than a hodgepodge of rules and exceptions, we can see recent
decisions as forming a coherent body of doctrine. While the resulting
doctrine is no doubt subject to criticism on many grounds, it is hard to
see how the Justices could have done much better given their somewhat conflicting normative commitments-to state sovereignty, federal supremacy, and individual rights.
IV.

WHITHER FEDERALISM?

Based on its own standards for constitutional interpretation, the
Court's recent state immunity decisions do not fare well. As Carlos
VIzquez has observed, there is a "rare unanimity" among legal scholars that the Eleventh Amendment decisions are unsupported by original understanding. 48 The constitutional text is equally unsupportive,
providing protection for states against only a small class of suits and
only in federal court.49 Nor does precedent provide powerful support
for the Court's position.5 0 Much the same is true of the anti-commandeering decisions, which proclaim state immunity from responsibility
for implementing federal programs. There is not a word in the Con48

See, e.g., Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State

Immunity, 98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); John E. Nowak, The Scope of the CongressionalPower to
Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Carlos Manuel V~zquez, What Is

Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1983, 1684 (1997).
49 "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States
by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or subjects of any Foreign State." U.S.
CONST. amend. XI.
50 See Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2269-85 (Souter, J., dissenting); Seminole Tribe v.
Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 100-16 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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stitution that prohibits such commandeering. 5 1 Nor is there any reason to believe that the Framers were opposed to comnandeering; on
the contrary, they seemed to count on it as part of their plans for the
new government.5 2 And again, such precedent as existed was un53
helpful, to say the least.
The five New Federalists on the Court seem blissfully uncon-

cerned by the cogency of these conventional legal critiques. No
doubt, the latest round of decisions will be subject to equally blistering
legal criticism, which the majority will no doubt complacently ignore.
Not only does the majority seem oblivious to conventional legal
arguments, but the Court also seems at most half-heartedly attentive
to functional concerns. In Alden, Justice Kennedy struggles in vain to
find some practical function for sovereign immunity.54 The Court's

expressed concern has been protecting the state fisc. 55 AsJustice Kennedy rather delicately puts it, sovereigns are supposed to be bound
only by their consciences in honoring their own contracts. 56 To put it
less delicately, the Union was composed of would-be deadbeats who
wished to maintain the option of defaulting on their debts.5 7 But in
51 For this reason, the New Federalism decisions resemble the much maligned
privacy decisions of an earlier time. See Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penumbra4 77 B.U. L. REv. 1089, 1090-91 (1997) (comparing Printz
with privacy cases such as Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)). A particularly
trenchant critique can be found in Evan H. Caminker, Printz, State Sovereignty, and the
Limits ofFormalism, 1997 Sup. CT. Rrv. 199.
52 As Vicki Jackson explains, the historical scholarship is divided on the question
of whether the federal government could commandeer state legislatures, but more
united on the view that commandeering of state executives was actually contemplated
by the Framers. SeeJackson, Federalism, supra note 4, at 2199; see also Erick M. Jensen
& Jonathan L. Entin, Commandeering the Tenth Amendment, and the FederalRequisition
Power:.New York v. United States Revisited, 15 CONST. COMMENTARY 355 (1998) (discussing Framers' contemplation that federal government would retain power to raise
funds through requisitions); Gene R. Nichol, Justice Scalia and the Printz Case: The
Trials of an OccasionalOriginalist,70 U. COLO. L. REV. 953 (1999) (arguing that Printz
Court distorted historical record). Even before Printzwas decided, substantial historical work had been done on this issue, which the majority ignored. See Saikrishna
Bangalore Prakash, Field Office Federalism, 79 VA. L. Rxv. 1957 (1993).
53 See Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982) (upholding a requirement that state utility agencies consider energy conservation issues);
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947) (upholding a requirement that state courts hear
federal causes of action).
54 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2262-65.
55 See Vdzquez, supra note 48, at 1727-28.
56 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2248.
57 On the connection between the 11th Amendment and state debt repudiation,
see James E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory"Accountof the Eleventh
Amendmen4 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1269 (1998).
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modem credit markets, this is a dubious privilege, as many a defaulting foreign sovereign has discovered when it tried to obtain new
credit.5 8 Immunity also protected states against unexpected tort liability, no doubt, but this too is less significant in the modem world
where liability insurance is readily available. In the end, the Court
seems left only with its faith in the innate sovereign dignity of state
govemments. 59 This veneration of state governments-rather than
history, precedent, or policy-is the mainstay of the New Federalism.
The inherent dignity of state governments is not an intuitive truth for
all of us. 60 But apparently it is an intuitive matter-more than that, a

matter of faith-for five Justices. Like any other credo, theirs is resistant to analysis and critique, for it rests on emotions such as allegiance
and respect rather than on a close reading of history and precedent.
It is not that the Justices are oblivious to text, history, and precedent.
Rather, they can read those sources only through the lens of their
constitutional faith-of the constitutional vision to which they have
pledged their allegiance.
Federalism is not an emotionally gripping issue for most people
today. As a result, the Court's federalism revival does not seem to
have aroused great public interest, so far as I can tell. Yet, the issue
has become more salient with each decision: to owners of intellectual
property who have no federal remedy for infringement, 61 to state employees who cannot collect overtime because of Alden, to gun control
58

See Richard Cantor & Frank Packer, Determents and Impacts of Sovereign Credit

Ratings, F.R.B.N.Y. ECON.

POL'Y REV., Oct. 1996, at 37, 40 (stating that defaulting sovereigns "suffer a severe decline in their standing with creditors"). Presumably, states
that fail to waive their immunity or provide other adequate assurances against default
pay a penalty in terms of interest rates.
59 The Court's policy analysis also seems lacking in other respects. For instance,
in Alden, the Court finds it significant that enforcement actions by the federal government on behalf of individual employees are politically accountable. See Alden, 119 S.
Ct. at 2267 (holding that suits by federal government "require the exercise of political
responsibility for each suit prosecuted against a State"). The upshot is that whether a
state employee receives overtime pay to which he or she is legally entitled will depend
on political considerations-which will no doubt include the state's allotment of electoral votes, its political alignment, the significance of the public employee union in
the electoral calculus, etc. This is not a savory picture, nor is it one redolent of the
rule of law.
60 Living as I do in a state where the current governor is best known nationally for
his earlier career as a boa-wearing professional wrestler, perhaps it is not surprising
that the idea of inherent state dignity does not strongly resonate for me.
61 See College Say. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119
S. Ct. 2219 (1999); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav.
Bank, 119 S. Ct. 2199 (1999).
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advocates unhappy with Printz,62 and so forth. 63 Thus, federalism issues are likely to receive more attention in connection with future
judicial appointments. What happens once federalism issues do receive greater attention, of course, depends on prevailing public attitudes toward state and federal governments.
Although the New Federalism is a deviation from our recent constitutional past, it may or may not be the wave of the future. In a
world without important international threats or domestic economic
crises, the appeal of the federal government may fade, with power diffusing upward to international organizations and downward to state
and local governments. If so, popular loyalty to the federal government may also wane. But that, of course, is only one possible scenario.
In the long run, the future of the New Federalism will depend less on
the technical arguments of legal scholars than on the temper of the
American people. In particular, it will depend on whether the American people prefer to pledge their allegiance to "One Nation" or to a
"Federalist System" of interlinked republics.

62 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
63 On the "and so forth" list, religious organizations dismayed by the demise of
RFRA in City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, would rank high.
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